



How Well Does Bankruptcy Work When Large Financial 
Firms Fail? Some Lessons from Lehman Brothers
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There is disagreement about whether large and complex ﬁ  nancial institutions should be allowed to use U.S. bankruptcy 
law to reorganize when they get into ﬁ  nancial difﬁ  culty. We look at the Lehman example for lessons about whether 
bankruptcy law might be a better alternative to bailouts or to resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act’s orderly liquidation 
authority. We ﬁ  nd that there is no clear evidence that bankruptcy law is insufﬁ  cient to handle the resolution of large 
complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. 
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One of the most important questions facing policymakers 
today is whether the bankruptcy process is, or with modiﬁ  -
cations could be, a suitable method for handling the failure 
of complex, nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. Although the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2009 established an orderly liquidation authority to unwind 
selected systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions, it left 
bankruptcy as the default for the rest. 
Opinions are sharply divided on the adequacy of U.S. 
bankruptcy law to resolve complex nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms 
in an orderly fashion. Somewhat ironically, both camps 
point to the market disruptions that followed the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy ﬁ  ling in 2008 as supporting evidence 
for their views.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis of 2007–2009 was a complex event, so 
it is not surprising that there are different views about what 
caused the market turmoil following Lehman’s bankruptcy 
ﬁ  ling. Those views involve differing opinions about whether 
the bankruptcy resolution of Lehman Brothers was orderly. 
For example, implicit in the FDIC’s analysis of the event is 
the view that the disorderly resolution of Lehman in bank-
ruptcy was a causal factor in the near collapse of ﬁ  nancial 
markets in the fall of 2008. Holders of this view often argue 
that U.S. bankruptcy law cannot effectively unwind complex 
nonbank ﬁ  nancial institutions, even if the law is amended. 
Another view, expressed by many bankruptcy scholars, is 
that Lehman’s reorganization went fairly smoothly and spill-
over effects were limited. Proponents of this view attribute 
the market turmoil after Lehman’s bankruptcy ﬁ  ling to poli-
cy uncertainty: The U.S. government decided to let Lehman 
fail when the market expected a government-assisted rescue. 
Still, they acknowledge that the law should be improved to 
better handle complex ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
We won’t be able to sort this debate out here, but we will 
point to some lessons that can be drawn from the events 
surrounding the Lehman bankruptcy ﬁ  ling. These les-
sons concern whether the insolvency of large or complex 
ﬁ  nancial companies can be adequately handled through 
the judicial process of bankruptcy. We also consider what 
changes, if any, need to be made to the bankruptcy code to 
make bankruptcy a desirable alternative to ad hoc bailouts 
or to resolution under the Dodd-Frank Act’s orderly liquida-
tion authority. In the end, the Lehman case is just one event, 
and though many people have tried to extract deep meaning 
from it, the conclusions we can draw from it, though useful, 
are limited.
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Note: Libor (London interbank offered rate) is the overnight interest rate at which 
banks borrow from each other in the London interbank market.  The OIS (overnight 
index swap) rate is the rate on a derivative contract written on the effective federal 
funds rate. For a discussion of the Libor-OIS spread as an indicator of ﬁ  nancial 
distress see Thorton (2009).
Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Figure 2. Credit Default Swaps
Note: As shown by the CDX.NA Investment Grade Index (which is an index of credit 
default swaps written against investment grade North American companies), the 
cost of buying credit protection rose sharply around the time of the Lehman bank-
ruptcy ﬁ  ling.  For an overview of credit default swaps and other credit derivatives, 
see Mengle (2007).
Sources: Markit; Bloomberg.
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U.S. Bankruptcy Law and 
Complex Financial Institutions 
The debate over the ability of U.S. bankruptcy law to 
resolve complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms largely centers on four ques-
tions. Does the bankruptcy of a systemically important ﬁ  rm 
increase the chances of market turmoil? Will the bankruptcy 
of such ﬁ  rms cause contagion? Does the law’s treatment of 
qualiﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts lead to disorder in bankruptcy 
resolutions? And ﬁ  nally, do limitations in the scope of bank-
ruptcy law complicate the resolution of complex ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms? The Lehman bankruptcy grants some insight into 
each of these questions.
Bankruptcy and Market Turmoil
Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008. Markets clearly showed signs of increasing stress 
thereafter and during the fall of 2008. Yields in short-term 
markets spiked the week following the Lehman ﬁ  ling. Risk 
spreads in short-term credit markets widened—indicating a 
“ﬂ  ight to quality” by market participants. For example, the 
term Libor-OIS spread increased around 350 basis points in 
the period following the Lehman bankruptcy (ﬁ  gure 1). A 
similar picture emerges from the credit default swaps (CDS) 
market (ﬁ  gure 2).
Some analysts maintain that it was Lehman’s use of the 
bankruptcy courts that caused the market turmoil. They 
often point to graphs like ﬁ  gures 1 and 2 as evidence of the 
insufﬁ  ciency of bankruptcy law to resolve complex ﬁ  nancial 
ﬁ  rms. Others claim that it was not the use of bankruptcy, 
but rather policy responses inconsistent with market ex-
pectations that caused markets to panic. That is, Lehman 
was allowed to fail when ﬁ  nancial markets, and even the 
Lehman management team, expected a government-assisted 
rescue. A closer look at events around that time suggests 
that neither view is entirely correct. 
The Lehman bankruptcy occurred during a time when there 
were good reasons for market participants to question the 
solvency of a number of large ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. The bankrupt-
cy was accompanied by nearly two dozen signiﬁ  cant disrup-
tive events in September 2008 alone, some unrelated to the 
Lehman ﬁ  ling and some related to its failure. The clustering 
of multiple events around the time of the bankruptcy makes 
it difﬁ  cult to identify the causal effects of the bankruptcy on 
markets, let alone the use of U.S. bankruptcy law. 
While Lehman’s failure triggered many problems in mar-
kets, event clustering makes it impossible to empirically 
identify the use of bankruptcy courts as the root of those 
problems. Moreover, it is impossible to separate out the 
impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy ﬁ  ling from the uncertainty 
created by its ﬁ  ling. 
Studies have shown that such uncertainty can have signiﬁ  -
cant effects on markets. For example, in 1982 Penn Square 
Bank was liquidated by the FDIC, which experimented with 
modiﬁ  ed payouts to resolve large bank failures (see Furlong, 
1984). These modiﬁ  ed payouts created uncertainty in the 
minds of the large, explicitly uninsured creditors of Conti-
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the event Continental was closed. This uncertainty drove 
the run on the deposits of Continental Illinois before its col-
lapse in 1984 (see Sprague, 1986). 
The source of market turmoil following Lehman’s failure, then, 
cannot conclusively be attributed to the use of bankruptcy law 
to resolve the ﬁ  rm’s insolvency or to the uncertainty created by 
policy actions inconsistent with market expectations. 
Bankruptcy and Contagion
When a large, complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm fails, the method of 
resolution should not be conducive to contagion. That is, 
the resolution process should not endanger the solvency of 
other ﬁ  rms. This is especially true in systemic crises, when 
the ﬁ  nancial system is already stressed. Bankruptcy critics 
often argue that bankruptcy law may trigger contagion be-
cause it is designed to pay creditors strictly according to the 
priority of their claims. There is no consideration of their 
ﬁ  nancial condition or potential market instability. Thus, 
contagion may spread through the use of bankruptcy if the 
recovery of creditors in need of liquidity is insufﬁ  cient, or 
indirectly through credit default swaps (CDS) written on the 
resolved ﬁ  rm’s debt. But the Lehman bankruptcy does not 
support the view that bankruptcy leads to contagion. 
The day after Lehman Brothers ﬁ  led for bankruptcy, the Re-
serve Primary Money Fund announced that it had “broken 
the buck”: Due to losses on its holdings of Lehman debt, 
the net asset value of the Fund’s shares had fallen to $0.97 a 
share. It was only the second time in history that a money 
market fund’s share value had fallen below a dollar, and it 
reﬂ  ected how large an impact Lehman’s collapse was having. 
Most analysts would concede that the Fund’s “breaking the 
buck” was a direct consequence of the Fund’s losses on its 
holdings of Lehman debt, that the losses led to contagion, 
and that the contagion effects impacted the money market 
mutual fund industry and the commercial paper market 
thereafter. It is harder to argue that the structure of U.S. 
bankruptcy law, and not the insolvency of Lehman itself, 
was responsible for the losses on Lehman debt and the sub-
sequent contagion. It may also be the case that the contagion 
effects were more a consequence of the money market funds’ 
overexposure to Lehman and to a speciﬁ  c feature of the 
money funds themselves—the pegging of the share price to 
$1. The share-price peg creates incentives for retail customers 
to run on a fund when its ability to maintain the peg be-
comes uncertain. Customers believe it is in their best interest 
to run to ensure par redemption of their money-fund shares. 
Lehman’s bankruptcy also tested the CDS market, as there 
was a reported $400 billion of credit protection written 
against Lehman’s debt. At the time of its bankruptcy, Lehm-
an was the largest failure to be handled in the CDS market. 
For the purpose of settling the CDS contracts, Lehman’s debt 
was determined to be worth 9.75 cents on the dollar at an In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association auction, lower 
than the pre-auction estimates of 12 to 15 cents. However, 
the settlement of credit protection written on Lehman did 
not have material effects on ﬁ  nancial markets.
Bankruptcy and Qualiﬁ  ed Financial Contracts 
Derivatives and repos are a special type of contract called 
qualiﬁ  ed ﬁ  nancial contracts (QFCs), which are exempt 
from the trust avoidance powers of the Bankruptcy Code 
and the automatic stay. The trust avoidance provisions and 
automatic stay are designed to coordinate creditor payouts 
and ensure that they occur according to the priority of the 
claims that were established when the original agreements 
were made and transacted, rather than in a race to grab ﬁ  rm 
assets on the eve of failure or after the ﬁ  rm fails. This spe-
cial treatment of QFCs in bankruptcy may complicate the 
process of reorganizing ﬁ  nancial companies in bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy experts disagree about the effect that the QFC 
exemption will have on the ability of ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms to reor-
ganize in bankruptcy. Lehman’s QFC book was the largest 
in history to be handled in bankrutpcy. 
While Lehman’s reorganization has provided additional 
guidance on which ﬁ  nancial contracts are exempted from 
the automatic stay and how QFCs will be handled in bank-
ruptcy, there is still disagreement on how well bankruptcy 
handles QFCs. Generally, opinions fall into one of two 
schools of thought. First, there are those who argue that the 
QFC exemption was an obstacle to an orderly resolution 
in the Lehman case. In testimony before a House subcom-
mittee in 2009, Harvey Miller, the lead bankruptcy attorney 
for Lehman, argued that the exemption of some 930,000 
derivative counterparties from the automatic stay led to a 
massive destruction of value through counterparties cancel-
ing their contracts. Ayotte and Skeel (2009) and Roe (2010) 
argue that the safe harbor provisions of bankruptcy for 
QFCs create perverse incentives for counterparties. Those 
incentives contribute to the systemic implications of a ﬁ  rm’s 
failure, including creating a stampede for the exits, which 
inhibit orderly resolution under bankruptcy. 
Second, there are those who argue that Lehman’s deriva-
tives portfolio was handled effectively because of the exemp-
tion from the automatic stay. Kimberly Anne Summe, a 
managing director at Lehman, provided this interpretation 
of the impact of Lehman’s counterparties canceling their 
contracts on the value of Lehman’s estate. Summe noted 
that only around 3 percent of Lehman’s derivative contracts 
remained in the bankruptcy estate 106 days after the ﬁ  ling, 
potentially preventing the spread of distress to Lehman’s 
counterparties by allowing them to quickly close out and 
re-establish their hedges before market conditions changed 
too dramatically. However, the beneﬁ  t of allowing quick 
re-hedging is unclear, as is the cost of losing going-concern 
value (the value of the company as an ongoing entity rather 
than a liquidated one) due to the stay exemption. 
Bankruptcy supporters argue that QFCs should be subject 
to a limited automatic stay, and there appears to be a case 
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QFCs in bank receivership cases, and there is little evidence 
that this limited stay for FDIC receiverships has been a 
problem. Moreover, when a nonbank ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm is re-
solved under the orderly liquidation authority established in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, QFCs are subject to a one-day stay. If 
this stay is priced into QFCs with depository or systemically 
important ﬁ  nancial institutions and U.S. bankruptcy law 
were changed to parallel the Dodd-Frank provision, markets 
would not likely be disrupted, and the pricing of QFCs 
would be identical across counterparties. It would also have 
the added beneﬁ  t of giving the bankruptcy estate up to three 
days to determine what to do with a derivatives book before 
counterparties could close out and net, provided that the 
insolvent ﬁ  rm ﬁ  led on a Friday. 
The Scope of U.S. Bankruptcy Law
The ﬁ  nal material stumbling block to an orderly resolu-
tion under bankruptcy of a complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm such as 
Lehman is the exclusion of certain types of businesses from 
Chapter 11 (which provides for corporate reorganization). 
In the case of Lehman, the exclusion of its broker-dealer 
subsidiary (Lehman Brothers, Inc.) from ﬁ  ling for Chapter 
11 complicated the resolution of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
International. Lehman Brothers, Inc., became the subject of 
a liquidation proceeding under the U.S. Securities Investor 
Protection Act four days after Lehman Brothers Holdings 
International ﬁ  led for bankruptcy, during which time the 
brokerage was borrowing from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. 
The absence of government support likely would have 
complicated the sale of Lehman’s broker-dealer to Barclay’s. 
Because it did not have access to the special ﬁ  nancing provi-
sions that ﬁ  rms ﬁ  ling under Chapter 11 are entitled to, the 
brokerage would have lost going-concern value but for its 
access to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. While the sale 
was quickly approved, without government support the sale 
may not have been possible under bankruptcy law. Whether 
this merits a change in U.S. bankruptcy law would have to 
be addressed separately for each exemption, though some 
argue the prohibition of broker-dealers reorganizing in 
bankruptcy no longer makes sense (see Skeel, 2009).
Policy Implications
Lehman Brothers Holdings International is not the ﬁ  rst, nor 
likely the last, systemic ﬁ  nancial company to run aground. 
The case of Lehman is interesting, however, because its 
failure occurred during the most severe ﬁ  nancial crisis in the 
United States since the Great Depression. The economic 
and ﬁ  nancial market climate in which Lehman failed greatly 
complicated any resolution method that did not involve tax-
payer assistance in the form of capital infusions or blanket 
guarantees of creditors. Yet Lehman has become the poster 
child for the orderly liquidation authority provisions of Title 
II of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.
Drawing inferences from Lehman about the effectiveness 
of bankruptcy in dealing with failing ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms is prob-
lematic. It is difﬁ  cult to use a single data point—the Lehman 
bankruptcy—to separate out the impact of Lehman’s failure, 
the use of bankruptcy to resolve it, and the policy uncertainty. 
Still, Lehman’s bankruptcy offers guidance on how to ap-
proach future failures of large, complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. It 
appears that there are provisions of bankruptcy law that 
merit review and possible revision. In the absence of those 
changes, it may be the case that systemically important 
pieces of an insolvent ﬁ  rm may be more effectively resolved 
in an administrative proceeding such as the orderly liquida-
tion authority established under Dodd-Frank. But based on 
the experience with Lehman, there is no clear evidence that 
bankruptcy law is insufﬁ  cient to handle the resolution of 
large, complex ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
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